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Abstract 
This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal 
uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former 
can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always 
reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information 
structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, 
even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful 
actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about 
the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, 
previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based 
enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures 
and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal 
sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal 
uncertainty.  
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1. Introduction 
Legal Uncertainty, the inability of economic agents to predict with certainty whether a 
privately beneficial action that they would wish to undertake would be judged by a regulatory 
authority as socially harmful, be treated as illegal and potentially subject to a penalty, has 
been the subject of analysis by economists and other social scientists for a long time. The 
impact of legal uncertainty on the optimal enforcement of economic regulations, the demand 
for legal advice and the incentives for compliance have been the subject of attention in the 
Law and Economics literature for at least three decades and, more recently, the literature on 
the enforcement of Competition Law. A review of contributions to these strands of the 
literature is also provided in Katsoulacos and Ulph (K&U, 2013a)
4
.  
Essentially, traditional literature distinguishes three potential sources of legal uncertainty.  
The first is uncertainty that agents may face about the type of their action - about whether the 
action is genuinely socially harmful. The second is uncertainty regarding the liability 
standard which we can think of as the threshold level of harm caused by an action such that if 
the authority perceives the harm caused by a firm’s action to be above this threshold it will 
disallow and penalise the action, while if the perceived level of harm is below this threshold 
then the authority will allow the firm’s action.  The third source of legal uncertainty, which 
has received extensive attention in the literature5, arises because authorities are unable to 
determine the actual harm caused by an action and so have to form some estimate of the 
harm, and an action is disallowed if the estimated value of harm is above the liability 
standard.  Since these estimates contain errors this gives rise to possible Type I and Type II 
decision errors whereby actions that should be allowed are disallowed and actions that 
should be disallowed are allowed.  In their analyses, Craswell and Calfee (1984, 1986) focus 
on the second and third sources of legal uncertainty and examine their welfare implications 
considering more specifically how under-compliance and over-compliance are affected. 
Other very important papers in the Law and Economics tradition that examine the 
implications of legal uncertainty, arising from the first and third sources above, for the 
optimal enforcement of economic regulations and the demand for legal advice are those by 
Kaplow (1990), Kaplow (1995) and Kaplow and Shavell (1992)
6
. The closest in spirit to the 
present paper, in the sense of examining implications – albeit for the demand for legal advice 
– of both the first and the third sources of uncertainty, is the paper of Kaplow and Shavell 
(1992) to which we return below.   
 
Here, as in K&U (2013a) we propose a formalisation of the concept of legal uncertainty, 
which can be termed the information structure approach. By information structure we mean 
what agents know about the factors that influence the outcome of the enforcement authority’s 
                                                             
4
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(2006), Kwak  J (2010) and Lang M (2012), 
6
 We neglect here the literature on taxpayer uncertainty in the enforcement of tax laws going back in 1980s, as 
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decision-making process. It is very important to distinguish what agents know about this 
process from the errors made by the enforcement authority in reaching its decisions. Below, 
purely on the basis of what agents know, which determines their perceived probability of 
having their actions disallowed, we distinguish and then analyse three different information 
structures. 
To clarify the difference between this approach and just associating legal uncertainty with 
decision errors, it is important to note that decision errors made by the authority are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. Thus: 
(i) It is not true that if there are no decision errors there will be no legal 
uncertainty.  This would only be true if also agents knew their type, that is, if 
they know the true value of the harm that their action causes to others.  
(ii) It is also not true that when there are decision errors there will be legal 
uncertainty in the standard sense defined above. After all, it is common to 
consider as an advantage of Per Se legal rules, that they do not involve legal 
uncertainty but of course Per Se legal rules can involve a substantial amount 
of decision errors.   
Firms’ perceived probability of having an action that they wish to undertake being 
disallowed will be influenced by all three sources of legal uncertainty: 
(i) Whether or not they know their true type – the true value of harm on others 
that their action generates. 
(ii) Whether or not they know the estimate of the harm of their action that the 
authority will make (which depends on their understanding of exactly how the 
authority reaches its estimates of harm). 
(iii) Whether or not they know the liability standard that the authority is using.  
 
We assume a zero liability standard that is common knowledge. Then depending on 
which of the other two sources is relevant in a specific context we distinguish between and 
analyse three different information structures, those of No Legal Uncertainty, of Partial 
Legal Uncertainty and of Complete Legal Uncertainty.  
 
We consider Kaplow and Shavell (1992) the seminal paper in the analysis of legal 
uncertainty – though they themselves did not choose to stress their results with respect to this 
aspect of their analysis. As we noted above, they use a model closer in spirit than all other 
models in the literature to the model below in the sense that agents face uncertainty because 
they may not know their true type or because of errors made in determining true harm by the 
social authority. Using their terminology, agents can be “uninformed” because of either of 
these types of uncertainty. They can eliminate the uncertainty and become “informed” by 
getting “legal advice” at a cost. The paper examines whether the demand for legal advice is 
socially optimal. In terms of the framework used here, we can say that in Section 2 of their 
paper, agents’ information structure is one of Complete Legal Uncertainty
7
 and by getting 
                                                             
7
 In this section, agents can be uninformed about whether their action is harmful and if they become informed 
they learn the true harm that is what the authority will determine if it undertakes an investigation.  
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legal advice they move to No Legal Uncertainty. In Section 3, agents’ information structure is 
one of Partial Legal Uncertainty and by getting legal advice they move to No Legal 
Uncertainty. Proposition 3 (in their Section 3) essentially establishes that getting legal advice 
and moving from Partial to No Legal Uncertainty is not socially optimal – so removing 
uncertainty reduces welfare. This result is also established below in the different context and 
objectives of this paper
8
. Thus, one of our main objectives here, unlike in Kaplow and 
Shavell (1992), is to provide a full and general analysis of the implications for welfare of 
changess in the errors made by the authority and of how, for given errors, different 
information structures affect welfare, providing a unified framework that allows an 
examination and comprehensive comparison of the impact of each one of them. Further, here 
we are also primarily concerned, unlike Kaplow and Shavell (1992), with a comparison 
between different enforcement procedures and their implications for optimal penalties
9
.  
Thus, while, as in Section 2 of Kaplow and Shavell (1992) we find that moving from 
Complete to No Legal Uncertainty reduces welfare, we also show the important result that 
moving from an Effects-Based procedure with Complete Legal Uncertainty to a Per Se 
procedure can also reduce welfare.  
 
Apart from the differences in the context and objectives, there are significant 
differences in the assumptions we utilise relative to Kaplow and Shavell (1992) and the other 
papers mentioned above. So, in these papers the substantive standard used by the social 
authority for assessing whether an action is illegal is that of total welfare while we assume 
that the standard is that of consumer welfare
10
. This is important given that the standard used 
influences in a critical way the deterrence objectives of the social authority and optimal 
penalties. Furthermore, the papers mentioned above conflate the probability of being found 
illegal into a single number while it is important for our analysis to take explicitly into 
account that this probability is the product of two distinct probabilities, one of which is the 
probability of been detected to take a potentially harmful action and the other the probability 
that the authority, making decisions subject to errors, actually decides that the action is 
harmful. Also, while in the exact context of the issues addressed by all the above papers it 
may be natural to assume, as the above papers do, that all potential actions undertaken by 
firms are non-benign
11
 (implicitly assuming a probability of allowing benign actions to occur 
equal to one and thus neglecting Type I errors)
12
, this is certainly not the case for many 
                                                             
8
 And also, as clarified below, on the basis of a completely different set of assumptions to those utilised in 
Kaplow and Shavell (1992). 
9
 And not just with a comparison across information structures. While comparing different enforcement 
procedures was the subject also of K&U (2009), as noticed above, in that paper the analysis was restricted to 
one information structure and only exogenous penalties.  
10
 This is a much more natural assumption in the context of many economic regulations (e.g. in the context of 
Competition Law or the law for sectoral regulation) for which in practice authorities’ objective is to maximize 
consumer welfare 
11
 That is, they generate positive or zero (but not negative) harm.  
12
 An alternative way to put this is to say that Kaplow (1990) and Kaplow and Shavell (1992) just deal with 
actions that in the terminology below, are presumptively illegal while we also have to consider presumptively 
legal actions. This also has serious implications for the results we get on optimal penalties under the different 
information structures.  
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business practices
13
, so in our framework we allow for actions that are either socially harmful 
or socially benign and to allow the authority’s decision errors to extend to its assessment of 
the latter type of actions. An additional difference between the above papers and the present 
one is that we examine the important phenomenon of desistance due to delays in the 
authority’s procedures affects the outcomes.  Agents’ anti-competitive actions will normally 
take some time before they create benefits and social harm and so the size of these accruing 
will depend critically on delays in the authority’s procedures, which therefore will affect the 
comparison of procedures and of optimal sanctions. 
 
The present paper considerably extends and generalises our analysis of legal 
uncertainty in K&U (2013a).  Specifically: in K&U (2013a) we do not treat the harm to 
others caused by the firms’ actions as a continuous variable and also we do not explicitly 
model the influence of estimation errors on welfare. In the present paper harm is treated as a 
continuous variable and estimation errors are explicitly introduced and modelled under the 
different information structures. Thus the present paper clearly disentangles the effects of 
increased estimation and thus of decision errors from that of different information structures 
facing firms and provides, we believe for the first time, a unified framework that allows an 
examination and comprehensive comparison of the impact of each one of them.   
 
The analysis leads to a number of contributions. Perhaps the foremost contribution is 
providing a clear general demonstration of how the “welfare costs” of increased legal 
uncertainty depends on the interpretation one uses concerning its sources. While these “costs” 
are certainly positive when increased uncertainty is associated with increased estimation 
errors on the part of the enforcement authority, the increase in “costs” can actually be 
negative when, for given estimation errors, firms face information structures with increased 
levels of uncertainty.  We also provide general proofs of the results established in K&U 
(2013a). Thus with the general framework of this paper we establish general proofs of the 
results that effects-based or rule-of-reason decision procedures always welfare dominate Per 
Se procedures and that higher optimal penalties can be associated with increased legal 
uncertainty. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next Section we set out in detail our model that 
allows us to disentangle the influence on legal uncertainty of estimation and thus decision 
errors from that of different information structures facing firms. Then in Section 3 we 
examine the implications of different information structures for optimal penalties and welfare 
establishing a number of Lemmas that underline the rest of the analysis. In Section 4 we 
examine the implications for welfare of increased estimation errors under different 
information structures and compare the welfare under different information structures for 
given decision errors with fixed and optimal penalties. In Section 5 we compare Effects-
Based decision procedures to Per Se and in Section 6 we provide a diagrammatic illustration 
of the different ways of measuring the welfare “costs” of legal uncertainty. Finally, Section 7 
concludes.  
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 Such as, for example, those dealt with by Competition Law. 
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2. The Model 
2.1 Background 
There is a population of firms that might take some action. This may be any action 
with potentially socially harmful effects condemned by law. This action has some natural life, 
and all profits, harm to others etc. are measured over this natural life.  Any firm will only 
undertake this action if there is some expected net private benefit/profit from doing so.   
However, the action may also have some effect on other agents – consumers, 
competitors - which may be positive or negative.   Let 0b >  denote the private benefit a firm 
will get over the lifetime of the action in the absence of any intervention from an enforcement 
authority.  Assume that this this is distributed across firms in a way that is independent from 
the harm caused by the action and is given by the density function ( ) 0 0f b b> ∀ > . 
Let 
k
h  denote the “harm” caused by firm k and assume that this is distributed across 
firms with a density function ( )g h  where ( )( ) 0 ,g h h> ∀ ∈ −∞ +∞ .  Let   
    ( )h hg h dh
∞
−∞
= ∫  
be the average harm and say that the action is Presumptively Illegal if 0h >  and 
Presumptively Legal if  0h < .  
Assumption 1  The density functions   and  f g  are common knowledge.   
2.2 Regulatory / Enforcement Authority 
There is a regulatory authority (RA) that investigates a fraction , 0 1π π< <  of 
actions that are taken, to determine whether or not they are anti-competitive
14
.  
We allow for the possibility that this determination takes place before the end of the 
natural life of the action.   If an action is found not to be socially harmful, we say that it has 
been approved by the RA which allows the action continue to end of its natural generating 
full benefit b for the firm and full harm, h  for society.  On the other hand if an action is found 
to be socially harmful, we say that it has been disapproved by the RA which will therefore 
stop the action, and, in addition, impose a penalty.  So a firm whose action is disapproved 
suffers both a penalty and a loss of some future profits.  Formally we assume that, if an action 
is disapproved, the firm gets just a fraction , 0 1Δ < Δ ≤  of the private benefit, b that it 
would have got over the natural life of the action and society gets the same fraction of the 
harm h it would have suffered over the natural life of the action.   The parameter Δ is positive 
and measures the inevitable delay involved in the RA’s learning that an action has occurred, 
carrying out an investigation and reaching a decision. 
                                                             
14
 As mentioned explicitly below we take this to mean that the actions cause positive harm to others.  
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Assumption 2  The values of  both   and  πΔ  are common knowledge. 
2.3 Decision Rule of Regulatory Authority 
For any action it investigates the RA has to decide whether to disapprove it – find it to be 
socially harmful – or approve it – find it was not socially harmful.  We assume that:  
• the RA operates a welfare standard whereby the only thing it cares about is the harm 
(to others) caused by the action taken by a firm
15
; 
• it does not directly observe the true value of the harm caused by any firm; 
• it operates an Effects-Based enforcement procedure. 
This final assumption means that in order to decide what to do in any particular case, it 
first gathers evidence about the likely consequences of the action taken by any given firm 
coming under investigation. Based on this, it forms an estimate of the harm caused by the 
action taken by any firm.  Let   
    e
k k k
h h ε= +       (1) 
denote the estimate of the harm caused by firm k where 
k
ε  is the estimation error.  Assume 
that, whatever their true harm, for all firms the estimation error is uniformly distributed on 
[ ],E E−  where 0E ≥ .  This allows for the possibility that the authority correctly observes the 
harm taken by the action – the possibility that 0E = . Throughout this paper we assume that 
E is exogenous. 
Assumption 3  The shape of the distribution of estimation errors, and the exogenous value of 
E is common knowledge. 
We assume that the decision rule used by the authority is to set a liability standard h  
and then to disapprove the action taken by firm k if and only if  
    e
k
h h> .     (2) 
In principle the liability standard may be positive negative or zero.   In this paper we 
assume that the existence of such a liability standard does not reflect a fundamentally 
different view between the RA and the firms as to where the boundary between harmful and 
benign actions lies, but rather it reflects the fact that, recognising that it has only an imperfect 
measure of harm, the RA may want to be cautious about the decision to approve/disapprove 
actions and so uses the liability standard as a threshold value that minimises the risk of 
making wrong decisions.  In principle this liability standard could therefore depend on the 
accuracy of the RA’s estimate of harm – i.e. on E – but in this paper we will treat h  as fixed.  
We also could allow the possibility that firms do not know the fixed liability standard.  
However, since we are going to allow the possibility that one of the reasons why firms may 
                                                             
15
 This would certainly be the natural assumption to make in the case of actions potentially prohibited by 
Competition Law, given that Competition Authorities use consumer surplus as their substantive standard. 
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not know for sure what decision the authority will make in their case is that they don’t know 
what estimate of harm the authority will make, and since the decision rule depends simply on 
the difference between the estimate of harm and the liability standard, it will simplify the 
analysis if we assume that firms know the liability standard.  Consequently in what follows 
we will assume that everyone knows the liability standard, and, furthermore that this is 
normalised so that 0h =  
Assumption 4  It is common knowledge that the RA makes its decision according to (2) and 
in doing so uses a fixed liability standard 0h =  
Given our assumptions so far, we can determine the RA’s decision outcome function, 
( );h Eδ , which defines the fraction of firms with true harm h whose actions will be 
disapproved by the RA, when the error bound is 0E ≥ .  This is given by: 
   ( )
0,
; ,
2
1,
h E
h E
h E E h E
E
h E
δ
≤ −

+
= − ≤ ≤

≥
   (3) 
Equivalently, ( );h Eδ
 
is the perceived probability of being disapproved by a firm 
whose action generates harm h when the error bound is 0E ≥ . Notice that if there were no 
estimation errors, so 0E = ,  then the decision outcome function is just the first-best one of 
approving all benign actions and disapproving all harmful ones 
Notice also that it follows from Assumptions 3 and 4 that the decision outcome 
function, ( );h Eδ , is common knowledge. Since 
    
2
2
h
E E
δ∂
= −
∂
     (4) 
it follows that: 
   0 if  0; 0 if  0h h
E E
δ δ∂ ∂
> < < >
∂ ∂
  (5) 
So, an increase in the estimation error raises the probability (δ) of benign actions 
being disapproved (Type I decision errors or false convictions) and increases the probability 
(1-δ) that harmful actions will be approved (Type II decision errors or false acquittals).  
The costs of Type I and Type II decision error associated with a given rule are, 
respectively: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0
; ( ) 0;
1 ; ( ) 0
I
E
E
II
D E h h E g h dh
D E h h E g h dh
δ
δ
−
= − >
= − >  
∫
∫
  (6) 
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It is straightforward to show that 
 
( ) ( )0 2 2
2 2 0
1 1
( ) 0; ( ) 0
2 2
I II
E
E
dD E dD E
h g h h g h
dE E dE E−
= > = >∫ ∫  (7) 
so, as expected, we get that: 
Lemma 1: an increase in the error bound will certainly increase the costs of both Type I and 
Type II decision errors.     
A final property of the RA’s decision rule that we wish to discuss is its ability to 
Effectively Discriminate between benign and harmful actions. To understand what this means 
let 
   
( ) ( )
( )
; ( )
; ( ) ( )
D
E
E E
h E h E hg h dh
h E hg h dh hg h dh
δ
δ
∞
−∞
∞
−
=
= +
∫
∫ ∫
  (8) 
be the average harm caused by firms whose actions are disapproved under the decision 
outcome function ( );h Eδ  and 
( ) ( )
( )
1 ; ( )
( ) 1 ; ( )
A
E E
E
h E h E hg h dh
hg h dh h E hg h dh
δ
δ
∞
−∞
−
−∞ −
= −  
= + −  
∫
∫ ∫
     (9)  
be the  average harm caused by firms whose actions are approved by the RA under the 
decision outcome function ( );h Eδ .   
We say that an Effects-Based decision rule can Effectively Discriminate iff it has 
lower decision error costs than the appropriate
16
 Per Se legal standard and, based on the 
analysis in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), this in turn is true iff  
    ( ) ( )0
D A
h E h E> > .     (10) 
Notice that ( )
0
0
0 ( ) 0; (0) ( ) 0
D A
h hg h dh h hg h dh
∞
−∞
= > = <∫ ∫  so (10) is certainly 
satisfied if 0E = .  Moreover, from (8) and (9) we have: 
 2 2
2 2
( ) 1 ( ) 1
( ) 0; ( ) 0
2 2
D A
E E
E E
dh E dh E
h g h dh h g h dh
dE E dE E− −
= − < = >∫ ∫ . (11) 
                                                             
16
 A Per Se Illegal  enforcement procedure is used if all actions of a particular type are disapproved, while a Per 
Se Illegal  enforcement procedure is used if all actions of a particular type are approved.  The former is 
appropriate if the type of action is Presumptively Illegal and the latter if it is Presumptively Legal 
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Finally, as , ( ) ; ( )
2 2
D Ah h
E h E h E→∞ → → .   
It follows that there will be some unique critical value of E, which we denote by 
 
E > 0
17
 such that (10) holds iff  0 ≤ E < E .  If the action is Presumptively Illegal 0h >  and  E

 is 
defined by 
 
h
A
E( ) = 0 .  If the action is Presumptively Legal 0h <  and  E  is defined by 
 
h
D
E( ) = 0 .  
Now, we are interested in the question whether legal certainty might be a reason to 
prefer a Per Se decision procedure to an Effects-Based decision procedure in circumstances 
where one might otherwise have wanted to use Effects-Based.  We take this to be 
circumstances where an Effects-Based procedure has lower decision error costs, so in the 
discussion that follows we will confine discussion to this interval ( 0 ≤ E < E ).  So we make: 
Assumption 6  We assume that the error bound, E, lies in the interval  0 ≤ E < E , and 
so (10) always holds, so the Effects-based procedure can effectively discriminate. 
2.4 Penalties 
We assume that if the RA disapproves an action then it imposes a penalty that is equal 
to a fraction 0φ ≥  of the private benefit that the firm earned until its action was stopped by 
the RA
18
.   So a firm that would have earned a private benefit 0b >  over the natural life of 
the action will, if its action is disapproved, earn bΔ  and pay a penalty bφΔ , generating a net 
payoff ( )1b φΔ − . We make the following assumption: 
Assumption 7   The value of ϕ is common knowledge. 
2.5 Behaviour of Firms 
We assume that when firms decide whether or not to take an action they anticipate 
that there is a  probability, π,  of having their action investigated and, if disapproved, having 
the action stopped and a penalty imposed.  If a firm thinks that, if investigated, the probability 
of having its action disapproved is , 0 1δ δ≤ ≤ , then the risk of conviction is πδ  and the 
expected net private benefit from taking the action will be 
  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 (1 )b b bπδ πδ φ πδ φ− + Δ − = − −Δ +Δ   .  (12) 
Assumption 8  A firm will take the action iff its expected private benefit is strictly 
positive, i.e. from (12),  iff 
( )1 1πδ
φ
πδ
− −Δ
<
Δ
.    (13) 
                                                             
17
 The precise value of  
E  will depend on the shape of the density function g(h).  
18
 In Katsoulacos & Ulph (2013b) we examine optimal penalties when, as is the case for most CAs, penalties are 
related to revenue rather than profits.  
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where, remember, that δ is a function of h and E. The issue is when is this condition satisfied 
and how does this relate to what firms know about the factors that influence how the RA 
makes its decisions. This brings us to a discussion of information structures. 
  
2.6 Information Structures 
We say that firms face legal uncertainty if, at the time they make their decision, they 
do not know for sure what decision the RA will make regarding their action, should it come 
under investigation.   
Given the nature of the RA’s decision rule, whether legal uncertainty arises, and, if it 
does, the precise form it takes could in principle depend on three factors:   
• whether a firm knows the true harm, h, caused by its action, and, if it does not, what 
precisely it does know;  
• whether a firm knows the estimate, eh ,  that the RA will make of the harm caused by 
its action, and, if it does not, what precisely it does know; 
• whether a firm knows the liability standard, h   that the RA will use in making its 
decision and, if it does not, what precisely it does know. 
Given our Assumption 4 the third factor is not in play here, so we focus on the first two.   
Even with just two potential sources of legal uncertainty there are many different set-ups 
one could analyse.  In what follows we will focus on just three information structures, which 
capture crucially different configurations.  We now define these structures, explain how they 
could arise in the context of our model, and set out the crucial features they embody. 
Information Structure  I:  No Legal Uncertainty 
This would arise if each firm knew in advance exactly what estimate of harm the RA 
would make in its situation.  This could arise if the RA set out the factors it would measure, 
the data it would use to measure these, and the calculations it would make, and if firms could 
costlessly access exactly the data the RA would use in its particular case and perform the 
calculations before it decided to take the action.   Then, since we assume each firm knows the 
liability standard, each firm would know exactly what decision the RA would reach in its 
case.    
Notice the following: 
(i) While this situation may not often arise in practice, nevertheless it serves to make 
the point that even though the RA is using an Effects-Based procedure there still 
could be no legal uncertainty.  Put differently, it is not true that the use of an 
Effects-Based procedure inevitably results in the existence of legal uncertainty. 
(ii) Because the RA’s estimate of harm is imperfect, two firms with the exactly same 
level of true harm could end up with one knowing for sure that its action will be 
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approved while the other knows for sure that its action would be disapproved. The 
fact that there is variability of decision across otherwise identical firms is not the 
same thing as legal uncertainty which arises when a given firm is unable to 
anticipate what decision a RA will make in its particular circumstances.  
(iii) This information structure could arise whether or not firms knew their true level 
of harm. 
A crucial feature of this information structure is that any deterrence effects that arise do 
not depend on what firms might know about their true harm.  Thus: 
• as noted, firms with the same level of harm may perceive very different probabilities 
of disapproval, and so face very different deterrent effects; 
• all firms whose actions are disapproved will face exactly the same probability of 
disapproval ( namely 1) irrespective of their true harm; 
• all firms whose actions are approved will face exactly the same probability of 
disapproval ( namely 0) irrespective of their true harm; 
• nevertheless there is some link between true harm and deterrence in that  the greater 
the true harm the higher will be the fraction of firms who know for sure that their 
action will be disapproved. 
So while there is some statistical sense in which there is a potential differential 
deterrence effect
19
 at work – on average actions which are more harmful will be more likely 
to be deterred than actions that are less harmful, this does not happen at the level of 
individual firms. 
Information Structure II:  Partial Legal Uncertainty 
Here firms are assumed to know their true level of harm, h, but not the precise estimate 
e
h that the RA will make.  Instead all they know is that (i) the RA’s estimate will lie around 
their true level of harm with an estimation error;  (ii) the RA will disapprove if the estimate of 
harm is above the liability standard.  Given assumptions 3 and 4 all firms with harm h know  
(a) that estimation errors are uniformly distributed with error bound, E;  (b) the value of E; (c) 
that the liability standard is 0h = . Consequently, all firms with true harm h know that the 
probability of having their action disapproved is  ( );h Eδ  as given by (3).  
The crucial features of this information structure are that: 
• all firms with true harm h perceive exactly the same probability of disapproval; 
• this common probability is an increasing function of true harm h. 
As we will see this sets up a very sharp differential deterrence effect, whereby all firms 
above a particular level of harm are deterred from taking the action while all those below it 
                                                             
19
 A differential deterrence effect refers to the effect of firms with more harmful actions perceiving a higher 
probability that their action will be disapproved if investigated. As shown in Katoulacos and Ulph (2009) this 
effect is crucial in the comparison between effects-based and Per Se procedures.  
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take the action.  Thus, by setting the appropriate penalty the authority can ensure that it deters 
all harmful actions.   
Information Structure III:  Complete Legal Uncertainty 
Here each firm knows neither its true harm, h, nor the estimate of harm, eh . Indeed it is 
assumed in this scenario that the degree of uncertainty regarding their true harm is 
sufficiently great that all that any firm knows is that their true harm can take any real number 
with density ( )g h .  As with partial legal uncertainty, the fact that firms do not know the 
estimate of harm means that firms assume that, if their true harm were h then the probability 
of their action being disapproved would be ( ),h Eδ .   Taken together these assumptions 
imply that all firms anticipate exactly the same probability of disapproval: 
   ( ) ( ), ( ) , 0 ( ) 1E h E g h dh Eδ δ δ
∞
−∞
= < <∫ .   (14) 
In this case there is absolutely no differential deterrence effect since the probability of 
disapproval is the same across all firms irrespective of their true harm. 
 
3. Implications of Different Information Structures for Optimal 
Penalties and Welfare 
We now consider in turn the implications of each of these information structures for the 
behaviour of firms, the optimal penalty and consequently for welfare. 
I:  No Legal Uncertainty 
Under this information structure, all firms know with certainty whether their action will 
be approved or disapproved if investigated. Specifically, a fraction ( )1 ,h Eδ−  of firms 
whose true harm is h will know for certain that, even if investigated, their action will be 
approved, and so, at the time they take the action expect to make profits 0b >  and so will 
take the action.  The remaining fraction, ( ),h Eδ , will know that, if investigated by the RA, 
their action will certainly be disapproved and so, for a given penalty 0φ > , will expect to 
make profits ( )1 (1 )b π φ− −Δ +Δ   . Given Assumption 8 and (13) it follows that if  
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
<
Δ
 then these firms will take the action.   
So if 
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
<
Δ
 all the firms will take the action.  However, of the firms whose 
actions would be disapproved if investigated, a fraction π will be investigated and, since their 
action will be disapproved and stopped, society will lose a fraction (1 )−Δ  of the harm they 
would have generated, so the net harm suffered by society in this case is  ( )1 ( )
D
h h Eπ− −Δ .  
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On the other hand, if 
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
≥
Δ
 all those firms who know for sure that their action 
will be disapproved will be deterred from taking the action, and so the only firms taking the 
action are those who know for sure that their action will be approved.  Even though some of 
these will be investigated, by definition their actions will be approved and society will get the 
full harm to which they give rise. So the harm accruing to society in this case is 
( ) ( )
A D
h E h h E= − .   
Social welfare (the negative of harm) under No Legal Uncertainty is therefore: 
  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 (1 )
1 ,
;
1 (1 )
,
D
NLU
D
h h E
W E
h h E
π
π φ
πφ
π
φ
π
− −Δ
− + −Δ < Δ
= 
− −Δ− + ≥
 Δ
 (15) 
Given our Assumption 6 that the error bound, E, lies in the range 
 
0, E
⎡
⎣ ) over which 
the RA’s decision rule can Effectively Discriminate, it follows from (10) that ( ) 0
D
h E >  so, 
from (15), welfare is maximised by setting a penalty that deters all firms who know their 
action will be disapproved from taking it, and the minimum penalty that does this is given by: 
Lemma 2: The optimal penalty under No Legal Uncertainty is: 
    
( )1 1
ˆNLU
π
φ
π
− −Δ
=
Δ
.    (16) 
Thus we get: 
Lemma 3: The maximum welfare under No Legal Uncertainty is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆˆ , 0
A D
NLU NLU NLU
W E W E h E h h Eφ= = − = − + > .  (17) 
 
II:  Partial Legal Uncertainty 
Under this information structure all firms of type h think that they face the same 
probability ( ),h Eδ
 
of having their action disapproved if they are investigated, and so 
anticipate making expected profits  ( )1 ( , ) (1 )b h Eπδ φ− −Δ +Δ   .     
As with the case of No Legal Uncertainty,  if, 
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
<
Δ
 then the penalty is so 
low that even firms who think that, if  investigated, their action will definitely be 
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disapproved, will find the expected net profit from taking the action is positive, so all firms 
will take the action, giving rise to total harm ( )1 ( )
D
h h Eπ− −Δ .  
However if 
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
≥
Δ
, then, since ( );h Eδ  is a strictly increasing function of h 
for [ ],h E E∈ − , we can define 
 
h
 φ; E( )  as the unique value of [ ],h E E∈ −  such that 
    
 
δ h; E( ) = 1
π 1− Δ( )+ Δφ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
,    (18) 
and all firms with  h ≥ h
  will be deterred from taking the action.  
So we have that welfare under Partial Legal Uncertainty is given by: 
   
 
W PLU φ; E( ) =
−h+π 1− Δ( )h
D
E( ), φ <
1−π 1− Δ( )
πΔ
− 1−π 1− Δ( )δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh−∞
h φ ;E( )
∫ , φ ≥
1−π 1− Δ( )
πΔ
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
  (19) 
Now since there is a one-to-one link between the penalty and  h
 , it is clear from (19) 
that the welfare maximising value of  h
  is  h

= 0 .  That is, the RA wants to set a penalty that 
deters all harmful actions and ensures that all firms whose actions are benign will take them.  
Of course some of these will be investigated and, because of decision errors, have their action 
disapproved and stopped.   
Since, from (3), ( )
1
0,
2
Eδ = , it follows that: 
Lemma 4:  the optimal penalty under Partial Legal Uncertainty is  
    
( )2 1
ˆ ˆPLU NLU
π
φ φ
π
− −Δ
= >
Δ
   (20) 
and  
Lemma 5: the maximum welfare under Partial Legal Uncertainty is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
0
ˆ 1 1 , ( ) 0PLUW E h E hg h dhπ δ
−∞
= − − −Δ >  ∫ .  (21) 
 
III.  Complete Legal Uncertainty 
  16 
In this information structure uncertainty is so great that all firms perceive the same 
probability ( ) ( ), ( ) , 0 ( ) 1E h E g h dh Eδ δ δ
∞
−∞
= < <∫  of having their action disapproved.   
It follows that if 
( )1 ( ) 1
( )
E
E
πδ
φ
π δ
− −Δ
<
Δ
 then all firms will take the action.  As we saw in the 
previous two information structures this generates welfare ( ) ( )1
D
h h Eπ− + −Δ .   
On the other hand if 
( )1 ( ) 1
( )
E
E
πδ
φ
π δ
− −Δ
≥
Δ
 then no firm takes the action and welfare is 
zero. So we have that welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty is given by: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 ( ) 1
1 ,
( )
;
1 ( ) 1
0,
( )
D
CLU
E
h h E
E
W E
E
E
πδ
π φ
π δ
φ
πδ
φ
π δ
 − −Δ
− + −Δ <
Δ
= 
− −Δ
≥ Δ
  (22) 
The implications for the optimum penalty are more subtle than in the previous two 
Information Structures. If the action is Presumptively Legal, so 0h < , then since we have 
assumed that the error bound lies in the range  0 ≤ E < E  where the RA can Effectively 
Discriminate and so, from (10) ( ) 0
D
h E >  it follows that welfare is always higher if all firms 
take the action.  So in this case the optimal penalty is zero – i.e.  ˆ 0CLUφ =    
If the action is Presumptively Illegal , so 0h > , then since our assumption that the RA 
can Effectively Discriminate implies that ( ) 0
D
h E h> > it follows that if the fraction of firms 
that are investigated is so small and the delay in investigating is so large that 
( )1
( )
D
h
h E
π −Δ ≤  then it is best to discourage all firms from taking the action and so the 
optimal penalty is  
( )1 1ˆ
( )
CLU
E
π
φ
π δ
− −Δ
=
Δ
.    However if the fraction of firms investigated is 
sufficiently large and the delay in investigating sufficiently small so that ( )1
( )
D
h
h E
π −Δ ≥  
then it is best to allow all firms to take the action and once again the optimal penalty is 
ˆ 0
CLUφ = . 
Drawing this all together we have: 
Lemma 6: the optimal penalty under Complete Legal Uncertainty is given by: 
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  ( )
( )
( )
0, 0
ˆ 0, 0, 1
( )
1 1
, 0, 1
( ) ( )
CLU
D
D
h
h
h
h E
h
h
E h E
φ π
π
π
π δ


<


= > −Δ >


− −Δ > −Δ <
 Δ
   (23) 
which implies: 
Lemma 7: the maximum welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty is given by: 
 
   
 
W

CLU
(E) =
−h+π 1− Δ( )h
D
E( ) > 0, h < 0
−h+π 1− Δ( )h
D
E( ) > 0, h > 0, π 1− Δ( ) >
h
h
D
(E)
0, h > 0, π 1− Δ( ) <
h
h
D
(E)
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
  (24) 
 
4. Effects of Increasing Legal Errors and Welfare Comparisons 
In the previous two sections we presented a framework in which information structures 
are separated out from estimation and decision errors.  Further in the previous section we 
derived explicit formulae for welfare under different information structures and shown how 
this relates to both the error bound and the level of the penalty.  We have also derived 
expressions for maximum welfare under the different information structures as a function of 
the error bound alone – where we have set the penalty at its welfare-maximising level.  
We are now able to undertake a number of comparisons to see: 
• How, conditioning on the information structure, welfare varies with the error bound 
on estimation errors; 
• How, conditioning on the error bound welfare varies with the information structure. 
In the first exercise we can look at how an increase in the error bound on harm estimates 
affects welfare either holding the penalty constant at some arbitrary level, or assuming that 
the penalty has been set at the appropriate level by the RA.   
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In the second exercise, since deterrent effects can vary quite widely across information 
structures for a given level of penalty, we will confine attention to the case where the penalty 
has been set at its welfare-maximising level. 
Before proceeding, notice that if 
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
<
Δ
 then the penalty is so low that no firm 
will be deterred from taking the action under any information regime, and information 
structures play no role in affecting welfare since they matter only because of their impact on 
deterrence.  
So in all the discussion that follows we will assume that the following assumption holds: 
Assumption 9  
( )1 1π
φ
π
− −Δ
≥
Δ  
 
4.1 Effects of Increasing Error Bounds on Welfare 
Consider in turn the various information structures.  
I. No Legal Uncertainty 
Given Assumption 9 we have  
   ( ) ( )ˆ( , )
D
NLU NLU
W E W E h h Eφ = = − +   (25) 
But then from (11) we have: 
   
( ) ( )ˆ, ( )
0
DNLU NLU
W E dW E dh E
E dE dE
φ∂
= = <
∂
.  (26)  
The intuition is straightforward. For the range of penalties under consideration given 
Assumption 9, with this information structure, all actions that the RA would disapprove are 
deterred and all actions that it would approve are taken.  Given the errors in its decisions this 
latter category will include actions that are genuinely harmful, while some actions that are 
genuinely benign will be disapproved and, anticipating this, deterred.  The greater the error 
bounds the larger the number of benign actions deterred (and the greater the benefit of such 
deterred actions)  and the larger the fraction of harmful actions taken (and the greater the 
harm of such actions).  So greater errors cause worse deterrence effects.  
So we have: 
Result 1 With No Legal Uncertainty both welfare and maximum welfare are strictly 
decreasing functions of the error bound. 
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II. Partial Legal Uncertainty 
Given  Assumption 9 it follows from (19) that  
 
W PLU φ; E( ) = − 1−π 1− Δ( )δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh−∞
h φ ;E( )
∫   (27) 
where 
 
h
 φ, E( )  is the critical value of harm above which all actions are deterred and below 
which all actions are taken.  
 
h
 φ, E( )  is defined implicitly by (18).  It is straightforward to 
show that this implies  
    
 
h
 φ, E( ) = E 2θ −1( )     (28) 
where 
( )
1
1
θ
π φ
=
−Δ +Δ  
 and so, from Assumption 9, 0 1θ≤ ≤  which ensures that
 
−E ≤ h φ, E( ) ≤ E .  Notice that if the penalty happens to have been set at the optimum value 
as defined by (20), then 
1
2
θ = .  If the penalty is below the optimum then 
 
θ >
1
2
  and  so  h

> 0 , whereas if it is above the optimum then 
 
θ <
1
2
  and  so  h

< 0 . If we 
differentiate (27) w.r.t E  we get:  
 
∂W PLU (E)
∂E
= −
π 1− Δ( )
2E2
h2g(h)dh
−E
h
∫ − E 2θ −1( )
2
1−π 1− Δ( )δ h, E( )⎡⎣
⎤
⎦
g h( ) ≤ 0  (29) 
The first term on the right hand side corresponds to the effect of increased errors on 
desistance  - the stopping of actions by the RA before the end of their natural life.  If 
decisions are only made when actions have reached their natural life ( )i.e.  if  1Δ =  there is 
no desistance and this effect disappears.  Otherwise the first term on RHS of (29) is 
unambiguously negative and an increase in errors worsens desistance because it reduces the 
quality of decisions: more benign acts are disallowed and fewer harmful actions are 
disallowed.   
The second term on the RHS corresponds to the effect of increased errors on 
deterrence.  If the RA has set the optimal penalty (so θ = ½) then all harmful actions are 
deterred and all benign actions are taken and an increase in errors has no effect.  However, if 
the penalty is too low then, as we saw,  h

> 0  and so some harmful actions are taken.  But 
now, from (28), an increase in E increases  h
  so even more harmful actions are taken and 
welfare is reduced.  On the other hand, if the penalty is too high then as we saw,  h

< 0  and so 
some benign actions are deterred.  In this case, from (28), an increase in E reduces  h
  so even 
more benign actions are deterred and again welfare is reduced.  
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So increased errors can make welfare fall both because they increase decision error 
costs AND because they generate poorer deterrence effects.  From (21), we get: 
( ) 0 2
2
ˆ 1( )
( ) 0
2
PLU
E
dW E
h g h dh
dE E
π
−
−Δ
= − <∫ .   (30) 
Since the optimal penalty has been set, this effect works purely through lower quality 
decisions under desistance, and so, for precisely reasons set out above is zero if 1Δ =  and 
unambiguously negative if 1Δ < . 
We can summarise this discussion in: 
Result 2 If there is Partial Legal Uncertainty then welfare is a strictly decreasing 
function of the error bound if either the RA makes its decision before the natural life of the 
action or the RA has set a sub-optimal penalty (or both).  Otherwise welfare is unaffected by 
the error bound. 
Corollary    If the decision is made by the RA only when the natural life of the act has been 
reached ( )i.e.  if  1Δ = , then maximum welfare (i.e. welfare at the optimal penalty given by 
(30)) is unaffected by the error bound.  Otherwise maximum welfare is a strictly decreasing 
function of the error bound.   
 
III. Complete Legal Uncertainty 
Notice that if the RA’s decisions are reached only when actions reach their natural life – 
i.e. if 1Δ = - then, from (22) and (24), both welfare and maximum welfare are unaffected by 
errors under this information structure.  This is because, under complete legal uncertainty, 
depending on the penalty, either everyone takes the action or nobody takes the action.  
Marginal changes in E  have no effect, so there are no deterrence effects at work.  Therefore 
increased errors can operate only through their effect on the quality of decisions in the 
presence of desistance and, if 1Δ = there is no desistance.   
If 1Δ <  then desistance can only matter in the situations where all firms have taken the 
action.  So when both of these conditions are met an increase in errors unambiguously 
reduces welfare because it worsens decision error costs:  more benign and fewer harmful 
actions are stopped. So we have: 
Result 3 If there is Complete Legal Uncertainty then: 
(i) If  decisions are made by the RA only when the natural life of actions has been 
reached ( )i.e.  if  1Δ = then an increase in error bounds has no effect on either 
welfare or maximum welfare. 
(ii) If decisions are made by the RA before the natural life of actions has been reached 
( )i.e.  if  1Δ <  AND if the penalty has deterred all firms from taking the actions 
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then, once again, an increase in error bounds has no effect on either welfare or 
maximum welfare. 
(iii) Otherwise an increase in error bounds unambiguously reduces both welfare and 
maximum welfare. 
Notice that errors affect welfare: 
• only through deterrence effects if there is No Legal Uncertainty;  
• through both lower quality decisions in the presence of desistance and deterrence 
effects if there is Partial Legal Uncertainty; 
• only through lower quality decisions in the presence of desistance if there is 
Complete Legal Uncertainty 
 
4.2 Effects of Different Information Structures on Welfare (for given Error Bound) 
In this section we take the error bound, E, as given and examine the effects of 
different information structures on welfare.  For the reasons given above we will assume that 
in each case the RA has chosen the appropriate penalty and so we compare maximum welfare 
under the three information structures.   We start by considering the case where the RA 
makes no errors (E = 0). 
Case 1. No Errors:  0E =  
If there are no errors then the RA will approve all benign actions and disapprove all 
harmful ones. So under both Partial Legal Uncertainty and No Legal Uncertainty, if the 
appropriate penalty is set all benign actions will be taken and all harmful actions deterred.  
Even though some benign actions will be investigated they will be approved and so none will 
be stopped. It follows that under both Partial Legal Uncertainty and No Legal Uncertainty 
welfare is just equal to that which would prevail in the First-Best – which we denote by  W

FB
- 
whereby only benign actions are taken and society gets the full benefit of these.  Welfare is 
strictly positive.   
So formally we have: 
Result 4 If there are no errors, 0E = , then welfare under both Partial Legal Uncertainty 
and No Legal Uncertainty is the same and equals that under the First Best.  Formally 
  
 
W
NLU
(0) =W
PLU
(0) =W
FB
= − hg(h)dh
−∞
0
∫ > 0   (31) 
Under Complete Legal Uncertainty two possible situations can arise.  The first is that 
no action is taken.  This will be the case if the action is Presumptively Illegal and the fraction 
of firms investigated is sufficiently low and the delay in reaching a decision sufficiently high 
that the optimal penalty to set is one that deters all actions.   The second is that all firms take 
the action.  Even if benign actions are investigated, if there are no errors they will be 
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approved. So as with both Partial Legal Uncertainty and No Legal Uncertainty society will 
get the full benefit from all benign actions.  However all harmful will be taken. A fraction of 
these will be investigated and if investigated, certainly disapproved and stopped – but with a 
delay.  So there will be a cost of all the harmful actions that society has to suffer either in full 
or in part.  So in either of these two cases welfare is unambiguously lower than with either 
Partial Legal Uncertainty or No Legal Uncertainty.   
So welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty is 
 
 
W
CLU
(0) = MAX 0, − hg(h)dh
−∞
0
∫( )− 1−π (1− Δ)( ) hg(h)dh0
∞
∫
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
  (32) 
Comparing (31) and (32), we find: 
Result 5 If there are no errors, 0E = , then under Complete Legal Uncertainty welfare 
is lower than under both Partial and No Legal Uncertainty.  Formally: 
  
 
0 ≤W
CLU
(0) <W
NLU
(0) =W
PLU
(0) =W
FB
.    (33) 
Case 2  Positive Error Bound: 0E >  
Notice that, from (21) we have: 
 
 
W
PLU
E( ) = − hg(h)dh
−∞
−E
∫ − 1−π (1− Δ)δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh−E
0
∫   (34) 
Also, from (17) we have: 
   
 
W
NLU
E( ) = − hg(h)dh
−∞
−E
∫ − 1−δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh−−E
0
∫ 1−δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh0
E
∫  (35) 
Subtracting  (35) from (34) we get: 
 
W
PLU
E( )−W
NLU
E( ) = − 1−π (1− Δ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ δ (h, E)hg(h)dh−E
0
∫ + 1−δ (h, E)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh0
E
∫ > 0  (36) 
The first term on the RHS of (36) is positive and relates to the benign actions that, 
because of errors, will be disapproved by the RA.  Under Partial Legal Uncertainty, with the 
appropriate penalty, they will all be taken, but there will be a loss arising because some of 
these will be investigated and stopped thereby losing some of the remaining benefit they 
would have conferred.  However with No Legal Uncertainty all of these actions will be 
deterred and so society gets none of their benefit.  Since it is better to lose just some of the 
benefit than all of it welfare is higher under Partial Legal Uncertainty.  The second term on 
the RHS of (36) relates to the harmful actions that, because of errors, will be approved.  
These will all be deterred under Partial Legal Uncertainty (with appropriate penalty) but will 
be taken under conditions of No Legal Uncertainty.  So this factor too implies that welfare is 
higher with Partial Legal Uncertainty than with No Legal Uncertainty. 
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So we have proved: 
Result 6 If there are errors, E > 0, then welfare is higher under Partial Legal 
Uncertainty than under no Legal Uncertainty.  Formally we have proved that for all E > 0 
    
 
W

PLU
E( ) >W
NLU
E( ) > 0    (37) 
Now consider what happens under Complete Legal Uncertainty.  As explained above, 
under Complete Legal Uncertainty two possible situations can arise.   
The first is that no action is taken.  This will be the case if the action is Presumptively 
Illegal and the fraction of firms investigated is sufficiently low and the delay in reaching a 
decision sufficiently high that the optimal penalty to set is one that deters all actions. In this 
case social welfare is zero and so unambiguously worse than under No Legal Uncertainty 
which, from (17) is positive.   
The second is that all firms take the action.  In this case, from (24): 
 
W
CLU
E( ) = −h+π 1− Δ( )h
D
(E) = − hg(h)dh
∞
−E
∫ − 1−π (1− Δ)δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh−E
∞
∫
= − hg(h)dh
∞
−E
∫ − 1−δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh− 1−π 1− Δ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦h
D
(E)
−E
∞
∫
= − hg(h)dh
∞
−E
∫ − 1−δ h, E( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦hg(h)dh− 1−π 1− Δ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦h
D
(E)
−E
E
∫
      (38) 
If we subtract (38) from (35)  then we get: 
 
W

NLU
E( )−W
CLU
E( ) = 1−π 1− Δ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦h
D
E( ) > 0         (39) 
Given our Assumption 6, that the RA can Effectively Discriminate, it follows from 
(10) that ( ) 0
D
h E >  so the expression on the RHS is positive
20
.  This captures the fact that 
whereas under No Legal Uncertainty all actions that will be deemed to be harmful will be 
deterred, under Complete Legal Uncertainty these will be taken and will be stopped only to 
the extent that they are investigated and, even then, with a delay. 
  So we have proved: 
Result 7 If there are errors, E > 0, then welfare is higher under No Legal Uncertainty 
than under Complete Legal Uncertainty.  Formally we have proved that for all E > 0 
    
 
0 ≤W

CLU
E( ) <W
NLU
E( )    (40) 
Corollary 1 If the RA uses an Effects-Based decision procedure, and if it makes errors but 
these are not large enough so it can Effectively Discriminate then there is a clear welfare 
                                                             
20
 Except of course in the case – which we have ruled out by assumption – where all actions are investigated 
with no delay – so 1, 0π = Δ =  and this term is zero.  
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ranking of welfare across information structures:  Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare 
dominates No Legal Uncertainty which welfare dominates Complete Legal Uncertainty.   
Formally 
   
 
0 ≤W

CLU
E( ) <W
NLU
E( ) <W
PLU
E( ) .  (41) 
Notice also that if, under Complete Legal Uncertainty, it is optimal to deter all actions 
and so 
 
W

CLU
E( ) = 0 , then, from Result 1, the gap between welfare under No Legal 
Uncertainty and welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty decreases as the error bound 
grows. If, under Complete Legal Uncertainty, it is optimal to set a zero penalty and encourage 
all firms to take the action then, from (39) and (11) it also follows that the gap between 
welfare under No Legal Uncertainty and welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty 
decreases as the error bound grows.  So we have proved: 
Corollary 2 The gap between welfare under No Legal Uncertainty and welfare under 
Complete Legal Uncertainty decreases as the error bound grows.  Formally 
    
 
d W

NLU
E( )−W
CLU
E( )⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
dE
< 0  (42) 
We can summarise the results of this Section in Figure 1.  Rather than proliferate cases, 
this is drawn on the assumption that 1Δ <  and that under Complete Legal Uncertainty 
welfare is positive.  If instead we had assumed that 1Δ =  then welfare under both Partial 
Legal Uncertainty and Complete Legal Uncertainty would be flat rather than decreasing.  The 
other alternative is that welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty is zero. But the essential 
features of the relative ranking of welfare under the various information structures is still 
captured in Figure 1. 
 
5. Effects-Based vs Per Se Decision Procedures 
So far we have focussed on an Effects-Based decision procedure that can Effectively 
Discriminate and examined how it performs under various information structures.   We have 
shown that, under Complete Legal Uncertainty it is optimal to have either all firms take the 
action or none.  It is natural to ask how this compares with a Per Se decision procedure which 
either disapproves all actions – if the type of action is Presumptively Illegal – or else 
approves all actions – if the type of action is Presumptively Illegal.   
It is clear that welfare under Per Se is therefore: 
    
0
0, 0
PS
h h
W
h
− <
= 
>
    (43) 
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If we compare this with (24)  then we see that, if the action is Presumptively Legal, 
then welfare is higher under an Effects-Based procedure with Complete Legal Uncertainty 
because even though, in both cases, there is no deterrence and all actions are taken, at least 
under an Effects-Based procedure some actions are investigated and stopped – albeit with a 
delay.  If the Effects-Based procedures can Effectively Discriminate then all actions that are 
disapproved are, on average, harmful, so society gains from having investigations undertaken 
On the other hand if the type of action is Presumptively Illegal then under Per Se all 
firms’ actions will be stopped under all circumstances and welfare will be zero.  However, as 
we have seen above, if the fraction of firms investigated is sufficiently high and the delay is 
not too great, then, under Complete Legal Uncertainty it would be better to set a zero penalty, 
have all actions taken, and pursue harmful actions through desistance. 
So we have shown: 
Result 8 If the RA uses an Effects-Based decision procedure that can Effectively 
Discriminate then even under Complete Legal Uncertainty welfare is higher than under Per 
Se. A fortiori, an effectively discriminating effects-based procedure always welfare dominates 
Per Se. 
6. Measuring the Welfare Costs of Legal Uncertainty 
The key message of this paper has been that in discussing the impact of Legal Uncertainty 
on welfare and the optimal choice of decision procedures it is very important to disentangle 
the effects of increased estimation and thus decision errors and of different information 
structures.  The implications of the former have been examined in the previous literature. 
However, this literature, failed to consider how different information structures facing firms 
affect welfare for given estimation and decision errors of a decision procedure used by an 
enforcement authority – e.g. Caswell and Caffee (1984, 1986).  The contribution of this paper 
has been to provide, we believe for the first time, a framework that clearly disentangles these 
two effects whilst allowing an examination of the impact of each one of them.   
The central idea is captured in Figure 2, which shows clearly the significance of 
disentangling these two effects for measuring the welfare costs of legal uncertainty.  Suppose 
it were assumed that firms know the true value of the harm that their actions create and also 
the liability standard and there is Partial Legal Uncertainty. Then in the absence of errors, it 
could be argued, correctly, that there is no legal uncertainty since each firm can accurately 
predict what decision the RA will make in their case.  However, if the RA cannot accurately 
estimate harm and has, say, an error bound 
0
E  then, firms can no longer predict with 
certainty what decision the RA will make – there is now legal uncertainty - and, with Partial 
Legal Uncertainty, welfare is lower.  One might therefore think of 
 
W

PLU
0( )−W
PLU
E
0
( )  in 
Figure 2 as a measure of the cost of legal uncertainty. 
But this ignores two crucial issues:  
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• even if the RA operates an Effects-Based decision procedure, and even though this is 
subject to error, it still could be the case that there is No Legal Uncertainty; 
• if we maintain an information structure under which there is No Legal Uncertainty 
then welfare falls even faster as the error bound increases. 
So if we used as an alternative measure of the cost of legal uncertainty one which focused 
purely on differences in information structure and held estimation errors constant then we 
would use 
 
W

NLU
E
0
( )−W
PLU
E
0
( )  in Figure 2 and find that this “cost” was actually negative.  
This radically transforms ones perception about the welfare “costs” of legal uncertainty. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper offers a unified framework that allows an examination and comprehensive 
comparison of the impact of on the one hand increased legal uncertainty associated with 
increased estimation and thus decision errors by enforcement authorities and, on the other, of 
increased legal uncertainty associated with different information structures that firms face 
when considering to undertake privately beneficial but potentially socially harmful actions. 
These information structures relate to what firms know about the factors that influence the 
outcome of the enforcement authority’s decision-making process. We show that it is very 
important to distinguish what agents know about this process from the errors made by the 
enforcement authority in reaching decisions.  
 
While welfare “costs” are certainly positive when increased legal uncertainty is 
associated with increased estimation errors on the part of the enforcement authority, the 
increase in “costs” can actually be negative when, for given estimation errors, firms face 
information structures with increased levels of uncertainty. This is not to say that we think 
legal uncertainty is irrelevant – we have shown that Complete Legal Uncertainty is definitely 
harmful compared to other information structures with an effects-based procedure, though it 
is better to use effects-based even with Complete Legal Uncertainty than Per Se.  Our 
conclusion is that one can only have a meaningful assessment of the effects of legal 
uncertainty on welfare and on the choice of enforcement procedures by being very clear 
about the information structures that firms face and by disentangling these from the decision 
errors made by enforcement authorities. We also provide general proofs of the results 
established in K&U (2013a). Thus with the general framework of this paper we establish that 
effects-based or rule-of-reason decision procedures always welfare dominate Per Se 
procedures and that higher optimal penalties can be associated with increased legal 
uncertainty.  
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